<Research Note> Chinese Foreign Policymaking during the COVID-19 Pandemic by 井上 一郎 & Ichiro Inoue
<Research Note> Chinese Foreign Policymaking
during the COVID-19 Pandemic
journal or
publication title






When Wuhan, China saw the first COVID-19 
outbreak in January 2020, which then became a 
pandemic and spread across the world, China’s 
aggressive foreign behavior came to be seen 
cautiously from other countries. Some argue that 
China has been taking advantage of the circum-
stances to increase its presence at a time in which the 
United States has become the most infected country 
and the Trump administration has proved unable 
to demonstrate its leadership in the international 
community.1 Others claim that China’s intensifying 
actions in the South China Sea and the East China 
Sea as well as the series of assertive stances toward 
Hong Kong and Taiwan should be taken as action 
aimed at expanding the country’s power.2 Even 
Chinese diplomats, who are expected to play a role 
in maintaining relations with other countries, made 
strong remarks that caused friction, especially in 
relations with Western countries. This phenomenon 
is labeled as “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy,” which 
1 Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order – China Is Maneuvering for International Leadership as the Unit-
ed States Falters,” Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2020 [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-
order] (Accessed on Oct. 11, 2020).
2 Lindsey W. Ford and Julian Gewirtz, “China’s Post-Coronavirus Aggression Is Reshaping Asia,”Foreign Policy, June 18,2020 [https://
foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/18/china-india-aggression-asia-alliances/] (Accessed on Oct. 11, 2020). 
Chinese Foreign Policymaking 
during the COVID-19 Pandemic
井上　一郎
Ichiro Inoue
The new coronavirus outbreak occurred in Wuhan, China, and it became a global pan-
demic. During this period, China’s diplomatic behavior became more assertive in the South 
China Sea and East China Sea as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Some foreign observers 
complained that China is taking advantage of the pandemic to expand its global influence, 
while the Trump administration in the US is unable to demonstrate its leadership in the 
international community. The recent hardline stance of Chinese diplomats has been labeled 
"Wolf Worrier Diplomacy." However, China’s assertive diplomacy is not a new phenome-
non in the post-corona environment. Behind China’s recent assertiveness, there is an overly 
defensive diplomatic awareness toward the rapidly deteriorating international environment 
that was triggered by the spread of the pandemic. To understand China's diplomatic behav-
ior in the period of Xi Jinping, it is also necessary to expound its foreign policy-making 
structure. After Xi took power, he emphasized the top-down policy decision making, with 
the emphasis on the party rather than the government. However, without knowing the dip-
lomatic reality that China is facing in the current international environment, the stress on 
the party and ideology often leads to a lack of sensitivity and a well- balanced awareness of 
the rest of the world.
Key Words  : China, Foreign Policy, Foreign Policymaking, COVID-19, Pandemic
Research Note
characterizes China’s assertive attitude during the 
COVID-19 pandemic period.3
Both international and domestic factors inf lu-
ence a country’s foreign policymaking. From the 
perspective of China, the recent deterioration of 
the US-China relationship is considered the main 
international factor. As for the domestic factors, the 
linkage between internal factors and foreign policies 
is always not easy to prove empirically, especially 
in the case of China, which has a less transparent 
political system. The approach from the construc-
tivist international relations theory that focuses 
on nationalism factors is often used to understand 
domestic factors in making China's foreign policy.4 
In addition, institutional analysis based on the struc-
ture of foreign policymaking is also useful for under-
standing China’s external behavior.
In this paper, I will discuss China’s actions 
observed during the spread of COVID-19 across the 
world, focusing on the following points. It has been 
argued that China is trying to expand its global influ-
ence by taking advantage of the pandemic; does this 
view truly explain China’s behavior at this time? In 
other words, has China’s strategic stance essentially 
changed during this period? What factors are thought 
to be behind China’s assertive action today?
Covid-19 and Assertive Chinese Foreign 
Policy
Looking at China’s external behavior since the 
beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, a PLA Air 
Force plane crossed the middle line of the Taiwan 
Strait into the Taiwan side in February, and similar 
cases have occurred since then. In April, a Viet-
namese fishing boat collided with a Chinese Coast 
Guard vessel and sank near the Paracel/Xisha 
Islands. Furthermore, Chinese and Indian troops, 
which had been eyeing the Sino-Indian border, 
clashed, and the Indian government announced that 
20 people were killed on the Indian side in June. At 
the end of the same month, the Hong Kong National 
Security Law passed, enforced by China’s National 
People’s Congress (NPC). In the relationship with 
Japan, despite Xi Jinping’s visit having been resched-
uled in early April, Chinese Coast Guard vessels 
have been continuingly active in the East China Sea 
around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In 
addition, during the spread of COVID-19, Chinese 
diplomats’ assertive remarks were often reported, 
which led to a backlash from their hosting countries. 
The series of incidents during this period suggest 
that China’s foreign strategy has become assertive. 
However, should this be interpreted as China oppor-
tunistically embarking on an expansion of power by 
taking advantage of the turmoil in the US and around 
the world caused by the widespread COVID-19 
infection?
China has shown a strong stance over the South 
China Sea against the United States’ “freedom of 
navigation” operation, even before the outbreak of 
the pandemic. Regarding the Vietnamese fishing 
boat collision and sinking incidents with Chinese 
vessels in April, similar incidents have occurred in 
the past, especially during the fishing season; thus, 
a direct causal relationship with the pandemic is not 
immediately detected.5 The PLA’s aggressive stance 
toward Taiwan should be understood in the context 
of expressing displeasure against the reelection of 
Cai Yingwen, the Democratic Progressive Party at 
the Taiwan presidential election in January as well 
as the ongoing rapid development of the US–Taiwan 
relationship. Regarding the Sino-Indian border clash 
and the hardline stance in Hong Kong, the two events 
have a specific background rather than ref lecting 
China’s intention to take advantage of the pandemic. 
The introduction of the Hong Kong National Security 
Law had been considered by the National People’s 
Congress following a violent demonstration in Hong 
Kong over the revision of the Extradition Bill in 
the previous year. In addition, the activities of the 
China Coast Guard’s vessels in the East China Sea 
and around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands had been 
3 See the following for references on this series of hardline statements by Chinese diplomats: Kuwahara Kyoko “China’s ‘Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’: 
Its limitations and problems exposed by the coronavirus crisis,”Institute of International Affairs Comment (2020-11), Japan Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, May 15, 2020, [https://www.jiia.or.jp/strategic_comment/2020-11.html] (Accessed on May 31, 2020).
4 Jessica Chen Weiss, “China’s Self-Defeating Nationalism: Brazen Diplomacy and Rhetorical Bluster Undercut Beijing’s Influence,” Foreign Af-
fairs, July 16, 2020 [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-07-16/chinas-self-defeating-nationalism] (Accessed on Oct. 11, 2020).
5 M. Taylor Fravel, “Does the global pandemic open new South China Sea opportunities for Beijing? Not really. China is just continuing its long-
time strategy,” Washington Post, May 7, 2020 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/07/does-global-pandemic-open-new-south-
china-sea-opportunities-beijing-not-really/] (Accessed on Oct. 16, 2020).
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continuing since before the pandemic.
Although China appears to have consistently 
taken a tough stance in this series of incidents, 
these are common in that they are related to China’s 
sovereign issues. Faced with diplomatic confronta-
tion with the US as well as the economic downturn 
within his territory, Xi Jinping is presumed to have 
been exposed to domestic pressure. In addition, the 
Trump administration in the US has been increas-
ingly blaming China for the outbreak of COVID-19. 
Under these circumstances, Chinese leaders cannot 
show weakness, especially regarding sovereignty-
related issues.6
To understand China’s external behavior, it is 
also necessary to take into account the policymaking 
and implementation mechanism that have jurisdic-
tion over each individual issue. In other words, the 
movements of the PLA in the South China Sea, the 
Taiwan Strait, and at the Sino-Indian border as well 
as the movement of the Coast Guard in the East 
China Sea fall into the military command system. 
The decision to introduce the National Security Law 
in Hong Kong was made through a domestic legisla-
tive process at the NPC. That is, these are not diplo-
matic matters under the jurisdiction of the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the narrow sense. It is 
not appropriate to treat these issues in the same way 
as the recent assertive remarks of Chinese diplomats 
(the so-called “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy”) and thus 
should be understood collectively.
Policymaking in the military in general and 
NPC on the Hong Kong issue are related to sover-
eign issues; they are inherently inflexible and do not 
respond swiftly to international circumstances by 
nature. Regarding the background of the military 
and maritime enforcement agencies’ activities, the 
concept of “Standard Operating Procedures” also 
applies as an organizational effort to build up budget 
and personnel and acquire more jurisdiction and 
power.
As the tension between China and the US 
mounted, China’s diplomatic approach toward Japan 
apparently softened, and the negative domestic 
campaign faded. However, the China Coast Guard 
has been continuously dispatching vessels around 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands area even under the 
improved Japan–China relations. While maintaining 
a strong stance over sovereignty issues, the Chinese 
authorities might have considered that it is not the 
right time for more aggressive action in Taiwan and 
the South China Sea as the international environment 
surrounding China becomes ever more severe, thus 
opting for a more docile approach.7
Looking at China’s movements so far, although 
assertive elements are certainly observed in its 
external behavior, it does seem that China is aggres-
sively trying to extend its influence by taking advan-
tage of the COVID-19 pandemic; rather, it seems 
that its already existing hard line since entering the 
Xi Jinping era has acquired a much clearer shape 
through the pandemic. In other words, if China’s 
assertive external behavior today is taken as the 
dependent variable, the COVID-19 pandemic can be 
regarded as a parameter rather than an independent 
variable.
“Wolf Warrior Diplomacy”
Compared to strategic issues such as the mari-
time issues and the Hong Kong and Taiwan issues, 
which involve sovereignty and are by nature difficult 
to respond to flexibly, the main role of Chinese diplo-
matic authorities is to implement foreign policies 
in the tactical field. It is possible to respond flexibly 
according to changes in the international environ-
ment; therefore, from the perspective of rational 
foreign policy strategy and even according to the 
theory of balance of power, China does not need 
to worsen its relations with the US allies, such as 
major European countries and Australia, in the face 
of strained relations with the United States. Chinese 
diplomats, including ambassadors, have repeat-
edly made assertive remarks in recent days, often 
leading to local opposition in the host countries, and 
are attracting attention as practicing “Wolf Warrior 
Diplomacy.” The background of such actions can be 
interpreted as the coexistence of an overly defensive 
6 M. Taylor Fravel, “Has COVID-19 Changed How China’s Leaders Approach National Security?” China File, June 3, 2020 [https://www.chinafile.
com/conversation/has-covid-19-changed-how-chinas-leaders-approach-national-security] (Accessed on Oct. 16, 2020).
7 “Too costly: Chinese military strategist warns now is not the time to take back Taiwan by force,” South China Morning Post, May 4, 2020, [https://
www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3082825/too-costly-chinese-military-strategist-warns-now-not-time-take] (Accessed on Oct. 16, 
2020).
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consciousness toward the antagonizing international 
environments caused by the pandemic and, there-
fore, a strong stance coming from the increasing 
nationalism in China under pressure from the United 
States.
One aspect of “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” is 
a statement directed at the antagonizing relation-
ship with the United States. On March 12, 2020, 
Zhao Lijian, deputy spokesman for the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of China, wrote on Twitter that 
“it may be the US military that brought the new 
coronavirus to Wuhan,” further fueling the conflict 
with the United States. However, Zhao Lijian had 
already had a fierce exchange on Twitter with Susan 
Rice, former US Ambassador to the UN, over racial 
discrimination issues in the United States when he 
was the Chargé d'Affaires of the Chinese Embassy 
in Pakistan in July 2019, before the pandemic.8 
Another front of “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” is that 
the Chinese diplomats’ remarks related to the spread 
of the COVID-19 infection brought local backlash 
in Europe and Australia. In this regard, China has 
consistently refused to accept the responsibility 
for the global spread of the new disease, and it has 
violently opposed Australian Prime Minister Morri-
son’s remarks calling for the truth about the source 
of COVID-19. However, even before the spread of 
the infection in Europe, conflicts with China had 
already occurred for individual reasons in rela-
tion to several countries such as Sweden and the 
Czech Republic, and the country’s relationship with 
Australia has considerably worsened from several 
years ago. 
It should also be noted that, in spite of the words 
and actions of Chinese diplomats, in the United 
States, where the relationship is already deterio-
rating, and in Japan, where the public sentiment 
toward China remains extremely severe, veteran 
Chinese ambassadors who have rich experiences 
and a deep understanding of the local situation 
maintained diplomatically restrained behavior and a 
cautious attitude. In response to the previous state-
ment by spokesman Zhao Lijian that the virus was 
brought in by the US military, Cui Tiankai, Ambas-
sador to the United States, made a euphemistic but 
negative statement.9
The words and deeds of the younger genera-
tion of Chinese diplomats convey an organizational 
culture within the administration that is rather 
welcome to show a strong stance against the attack 
from other countries. In addition, nowadays, in the 
organization of the diplomatic system, it is necessary 
for top diplomats to show patriotic attitudes for self-
protection and political survival against Xi Jinping’s 
leadership. It may be possible that a phenomenon 
such as the “competition of loyalty” occurred among 
Chinese top government officials. It may have been 
acknowledged that, even if such words and deeds 
undermine China’s long-term and strategic national 
interests, they will serve the immediate interests of 
each individual and organization.
As the US–China tensions worsen, it is also 
necessary to show a strong external stance in relation 
to domestic public opinion. Zhao Lijian has remained 
in the post of Deputy Press Secretary of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, despite causing even greater 
opposition in the United States concerning the 
controversial remarks about COVID-19 having been 
brought by the US military. Prior to that, despite his 
racist remarks when he was stationed in Pakistan, 
Zhao was later appointed as Deputy Press Secretary 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—clearly a promo-
tion within the organization.
On the other hand, in relation to Europe, China, 
which succeeded in curbing the spread of the infec-
tion domestically, began to provide assistance and 
initiated active diplomacy toward seriously infected 
countries in Europe, including Italy, where the 
outbreak first started in the continent. China tried 
to regain lost trust in the international community 
through excessive diplomatic offensive with a heavy 
Chinese-style propaganda, resulting in negative 
impressions among major European countries.
This time, China initiated a highly active tele-
phone diplomacy. President Xi Jinping and Premier 
Li Keqiang called European leaders, and Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi reached out to his European coun-
terparts. However, while Xi Jinping made phone 
8 “Former US national security adviser Susan Rice calls Chinese diplomat Zhao Lijian ‘a racist disgrace’ after Twitter tirade,” South China Morn-
ing Post, July 15, 2019 [https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3018676/susan-rice-calls-chinese-diplomat-zhao-lijian-racist-
disgrace] (Accessed on Oct. 16, 2020).
9 「崔天凯大使接受AXIOS和HBO采访实录」『中华人民共和国在美利坚合众国大使馆』 March 23, 2020 [http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/
sgxx/cuids/DSJH/t1759545.htm] (Accessed on Oct. 15, 2020).
50
Journal  of  Policy  Studies   No.62  (March  2021)
calls to major countries leaders, such as those of 
Italy, Germany, France, and Britain, Premier Li 
Keqiang called the European Commission President, 
Von der Leyen.10 China’s approach to Greece facing 
economic trouble has been received with caution 
among EU members since it might damage the EU’s 
overall unity. The EU, with its weak cohesion, is now 
sensitive to China’s individualized approach to each 
member state. The EU then decided to accept mask 
support aid from Taiwan and balanced against China 
even by taking political risks.11
French President Emmanuel Macron advocated 
holding a G7 video summit conference, where China 
is not a member state, to discuss how to curb the 
spread of the infection.12 In addition, anti-Chinese 
sentiment has risen in Britain, which had once 
shown an attitude of increasing dependence on the 
Chinese economy after Brexit. Britain then further 
tightened its attitude over the Hong Kong issue. Even 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had previ-
ously refrained from making harsh statements on 
China due to economic considerations, has begun to 
complain about China’s transparency.13
In recent years, China has been promoting the 
concept of “discourse right” (Huayu quan) and trying 
to “tell the story of China and convey the voice of 
China” in the international discourse.14 This clearly 
differs from the conventional “public diplomacy,” 
which aims to gain the sympathy of the people of the 
counterpart country and the international commu-
nity.
In China, when the COVID-19 infection began 
to subside, the Chinese Communist Party initiated 
the propaganda that “the containment of infection 
was due to the leadership of President Xi Jinping” 
and that “people should thank the party and the 
president.” Furthermore, the CCP tried to persuade 
its people that the “world is grateful to China” by 
introducing the examples of Pakistan and other 
countries on which China has a significant inf lu-
ence.15 Even in the United States, which is in the 
middle of a severe conflict with China, the official 
Chinese Consulate-General in Chicago has report-
edly sought to obtain appreciation from Wisconsin’s 
parliamentary members for China’s contribution to 
the world in handling COVID-19, causing backlash 
from the US counterpart.16 Furthermore, the inter-
national community will react with great discomfort 
to the opinion that the world should thank China 
because it has contributed to preventing the spread 
of the infection to the world by containing it during 
its earlier stages.17 For China, it was a campaign 
aimed at restoring trust and improving its interna-
tional status. However, it seemed that the Chinese 
Communist Party’s traditional propaganda style was 
being directly exported overseas as it was. Excessive 
diplomatic offensives without sympathy in the inter-
national community had the opposite effect, and the 
Western media subsequently labeled it “Mask Diplo-
macy.”
Party-led Foreign Policy Decision-Making
To understand China’s external behavior, which 
does not seem to be “rational” from the outside, it is 
10 “EU fires warning shot at China in coronavirus battle of the narratives,” South China Morning Post, March 20.2020 [https://www.scmp.com/
news/china/diplomacy/article/3076728/eu-fires-warning-shot-china-coronavirus-battle-narratives] (Accessed on Oct.15, 2020).
11 “EU leader Ursula von der Leyen risks Beijing’s ire by lauding Taiwan’s donation of 5.6 million masks for coronavirus battle,” South China Morn-
ing Post, April 2, 2020 [https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3078032/eu-leader-ursula-von-der-leyen-risks-beijings-ire-lauding] 
(Accessed on Oct.15, 2020).
12 Subsequently, a teleconference was held among the G20 countries (including China) as well as among Japan, China, and South Korea, but the G7 
teleconference was held using a secret line to prevent bugging. “Teleconference diplomacy is limited: Leaders of the world unable to speak their 
minds” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 30, 2020 [https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO57407670Q0A330C2TCR000/ ] (Accessed on Oct. 15, 
2020).
13 “Merkel demands transparency from China amidst increasing pressure from Europe and the US on coronavirus” AFP (Japanese language edi-
tion), April 21, 2020 [https://www.afpbb.com/articles/-/3279524?pid=22317608] (last accessed on Oct 15, 2020).
14 「中国外交与国际话语权提升的思考」『中国社会科学院学报』2020年第２期 [http://www.cssn.cn/gjgxx/gj_zgwj/202005/t20200527_5134758.
shtml] (last accessed on Oct 15, 2020).
15 「巴基斯担参议院通过决议感谢中国支持巴方攻击疫情　反对针对中国的毫无根据的指控」『人民网』 May 14, 2020, http://world.people.com.
cn/n1/2020/0514/c1002-31709473.html (last accessed on Oct.15, 2020).
16 “Why China is Losing the coronavirus narrative,” Financial Times, April.19, 2020 [https://www.ft.com/content/8d7842fa-8082-11ea-82f6-
150830b3b99a] (Accessed on Oct.15, 2020).
17 Official news agency, Xinhua has carried this opinion appeared on 『微信公众号黄生看金融』, 「理直气壮、世界应该感谢中国」『新华网』 March 
4, 2020 [http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-03/04/c_1125660473.htm] (last accessed on Oct. 16, 2020).
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necessary to pay attention to the structure of its poli-
cymaking mechanism. In China, traditional factors 
are likely to cause bias in the policymaking and 
implementation stages, such as the highest leaders 
far from the field and the many layers of complexed 
bureaucracy that exist in between. Such a structure 
in policymaking is labeled “Fragmented Authori-
tarianism” and remains a useful analytical frame-
work.18 Even for instructions from senior leaders 
or higher departments, sabotage or interpretations 
sometimes happen in line with their interests as a 
result of the bureaucratic implementation process. 
On the contrary, in order to show what the leader 
thinks and wants to see, the lower departments may 
overly respond to the instructions from above and 
act, which may worsen the problem. The existence of 
such biases rooted in China’s organizational culture 
often results in the inability to achieve rational policy 
effects originally intended by policymakers. 
In addition, under the strict organizational disci-
pline of the Chinese Communist Party, the policies, 
especially in the field of foreign and security, once 
agreed among the higher party members require 
absolute obedience, and it is usually difficult for 
lower-level implementation departments to review 
and correct them based on the experience and exper-
tise of their field. Richard C. Bush stated that, “The 
bureaucrats are very cautious and reluctant to give 
creative advice when it comes to difficult decisions 
that the supreme leader must make a final decision.”19 
As a result, in China, the recognition, adjustment, 
and change of failed policy, including in the diplo-
matic sphere, always take time and tend to be passive 
to rapid changes in the external environment.
After Xi Jinping introduced the “top-down 
design” of policymaking to resolve the fragmentation 
stemming from the Chinse organizational culture, 
policy implementation biases have further intensi-
fied. Xi Jinping pursued a strong political leadership 
by exercising political system reforms with respect 
to issues such as the lack of leadership by the decen-
tralized structure of the Political Bureau Standing 
Committee, passive and inefficient governance, 
and immobilization of the bureaucratic mechanism 
by technocrats with his predecessor Hu Jintao. Xi 
Jinping set up several leading small groups belonging 
to the Party Central, and Xi became “the chairman of 
everything” with the aim to concentrate the power in 
the hands of the Party. At the same time, Xi’s reform 
was aimed at transferring substantive authority from 
the State Council, the government sector, to the Party 
Central.
In the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CCP 
Congress 2013, the CCP established many leading 
small groups, including the Central Comprehensively 
Deepening Reform Leading Small Group.20 In addi-
tion, the Central National Security Commission was 
established for the purpose of unified and intensive 
guidance on China’s national security at the Politburo 
Conference in January 2014.21 Furthermore, orga-
nizational reforms were announced for the existing 
major leading small groups at the end of March 2018. 
As a result, the Central Foreign Affairs Leading 
Small Group and three other leading small groups 
were upgraded to “Committee” with the purpose 
of “strengthening the centralized guidance of the 
party and the centralized unification of responsibili-
ties for important operations related to the party and 
state affairs.” Traditionally, the role of leading small 
groups has been understood as a policy coordinating 
and advisory body, but the effect of being upgraded 
to “Committee” is the strengthening of policymaking 
authority.
Since the Reform and Opening-up era, the State 
Council and other governmental organizations have 
accumulated expertise in everyday administrative 
operations and gradually taken on a substantial role, 
not only in policy implementation but also in the 
decision-making arena. Subsequently, the role of 
the Party side has shifted to showing guidance and 
direction and sometime intervening only in impor-
tant policies. However, under Xi Jinping, leading 
small groups have begun to intervene not only in the 
more substantial process of policymaking, but policy 
18 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China – Leaders, Structures, and Processes, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1988. Andrew Martha, “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process,” The China Quarterly, 
Vol. 200, Dec.2009, pp.995-1012.
19 Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity, China-Japan Security Relations, Washington, D.C. The Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p.146.
20 Allice L. Miller, “More Already on the Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, Summer 2014: Issue 44, July 28, 
2014 [https://www.hoover.org/research/more-already-central-committees-leading-small-groups] (Accessed on Oct.15, 2020).
21 「习近平任中央国家安全委员会主席」『新华网』、Jan.24, 2014 [http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2014-01/24/c_119122483.htm] (last accessed 
on Oct. 15, 2020).
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implementation arena.22
Guidance from the Party is also strengthening 
among diplomats, and their remarks are increasingly 
required to be in line with the logic of domestic CCP 
propaganda.23 Even within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs under the State Council, it is symbolic that 
Qi Yu was appointed as the party secretary of the 
CCP Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in 2019.24 Qi Yu is not a career diplomat: his previous 
job was Deputy Director of the Party Central Orga-
nization Department. He has no experience in 
diplomacy and has consistently been involved in the 
Party’s domestic affairs.25 The Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has witnessed cases of exchanging 
executive personnel among the other ministries and 
domestic organizations. However, this is the first 
time in recent years that the Secretary of the Party 
Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
not come from the background of long-time serving 
career diplomats. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
with knowledge of overseas affairs supported by 
fluency in foreign languages, is expected to feedback 
its expertise in the policymaking process at a higher 
level in the Party Central. However, this time, a man 
with an external view nurtured by domestic Party 
affairs without experience of any foreign affairs was 
placed in an important post. 
If a party that distances itself from diplomacy 
and emphasizes ideology becomes more important 
not only in foreign policy decision-making but also 
in its implementation, it will reduce sensitivity to the 
external environment. As a result, an ever-increasing 
gap will exist between the reality surrounding China 
and China’s own perception of international affairs.
Conclusion
As mentioned above, it should be understood 
that not only China’s aggressive and hardline diplo-
macy has been triggered by the recent COVID-19 
outbreak, but China’s existing foreign stance has 
become clearer throughout this period. It can also be 
said that the basic structure of international affairs 
surrounding China has become more apparent 
through the pandemic, and the US–China conflict 
has increasingly worsened. In addition, the diver-
gence between the US-centered liberal democratic 
nations and China-centered authoritarian states along 
the Belt and Road Initiative, which relies heavily on 
China’s support, has widened. Furthermore, it has 
become apparent that China will take advantage 
of the composition of international organizations, 
which, in terms of number, developing countries 
exceed advanced liberal democracies, to expand its 
inf luence, and to compete with the United States 
and its allies. From the point of China’s challenge 
to a free and liberal international order, the United 
States and China were already in a severe conflict 
even before the pandemic. On the other hand, China, 
as seen from Europe in the past, has a great deal of 
economic leverage; because of its distance, European 
countries do not have to be concerned about national 
security coming from China. Despite individual 
problems, even in major European countries such 
as Britain, France, and Germany have been keeping 
a different stance from the United States’ strict 
attitude toward China. Therefore, although China’s 
traditional basic strategy was to divide the United 
States and Europe, its failed diplomacy with a lack of 
“sensitivity” raised caution among major European 
countries. Theoretically, being in a serious conflict 
with the United States, as a diplomatic strategy, 
China should not confront its allies or diplomatic 
partners. However, as for its self-awareness, China 
might believe that many countries in the world would 
still welcome China’s support; thus, it is not always 
isolated. Furthermore, it is also possible to under-
stand that, although the pandemic has caused great 
damage to its own country, the loss to other major 
countries was even greater due to the worldwide 
spread of the infection, resulting in China’s “relative 
gain.”
Another thing that has become apparent through 
22 Cristopher K. Johnson, Scott Kennedy, Mingda Qiu, “Xi’s Signature Governance Innovation: The Rise of Leading Small Groups,” CSIS Com-
mentary, October 17, 2017 [https://www.csis.org/analysis/xis-signature-governance-innovation-rise-leading-small-groups.] (Accessed on Oct.15, 
2020).
23 Kawashima, Shin, “Policy Agenda for Xi Jinping Administration,” Security Studies, Kashima Institute of International Peace, Vol.2, No3. 2020, 
p.82.
24 Yamaguchi, Shinji, “The Rise of Wolf Worrier Diplomat?” NID Commentary, National Institute for Defense Studies, No.116, May 26, 2020 (last 
accessed on Oct. 15, 2020). 
25 「外交部主要官员」『中国外交部』 [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zygy_673101/qy/] (last accessed on Oct. 15, 2020).
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the spread of the pandemic is China’s active building 
of relationships and the expansion of its influence 
on international organizations. WHO Director-
General, Dr. Tedros visited China and praised its 
initial response in handling COVID-19 when he 
met Xi Jinping at the end of January.26 Afterward, 
as the infection spread worldwide, and international 
criticism rose against the Chinese government’s 
initial response, China justified its action through 
the authority of international organizations’ knowl-
edge and expertise as well as their politically neutral 
status. 
At the UN General Assembly online speech in 
September 2020, Xi Jinping said, “We walk the road 
of multilateralism as resolutely defending the United 
Nations as the core of international relations.”27 Until 
now, China has not directly denied the framework 
of the liberal international order; rather, it has taken 
advantage of it and fully enjoyed its principles, 
such as that of free trade. Today, however, China no 
longer supports the Western-oriented liberal interna-
tional order that emphasizes values such as freedom, 
democracy, and human rights, and a security system 
centered on the United States. Instead, it has begun 
to actively support an international order centered on 
the United Nations.
This article is based on the academic presenta-
tions at the annual conference of the Japan Associa-
tion for Modern China Studies (Nov.1 2020) and the 
Korean Association of International Studies (Dec.5 
2020).
26 When Director-General Tedros visited China, several of his close aides advised that, even if he praised China’s initial response, his praise should 
be restrained, but as the novel coronavirus spread increasingly throughout the world, they also feared that there was a risk of losing the coopera-
tion of the Chinese government. “Praise for China in anticipation of criticism: The distress and intentions of WHO’s Tedros” Reuters (Japanese 
language edition), May 19, 2020 [https://jp.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-who-tedros-idJPKBN22U34J] (last accessed on Oct. 16, 2020). 
27 「习近平在联合国成立75周年纪念峰会上发表重要讲话（2020年9月21日）」『中国外交部』 [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1816765.
shtml] (last accessed on Nov. 11, 2020).
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